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Ortega-Reagan Chessboard Still Has Peace in Stalemate

November 15, 1987|Wayne S. Smith | Wayne S. Smith, adjunct professor of Latin American Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is author of "The Closest of Enemies" (W.W. Norton), an account of U.S.-Cuban relations since 1957

WASHINGTON — Over the past 10 days President Ronald Reagan and President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua have given an impressive display of knight and pawn. They have moved their pieces about the board seeking an advantage but have not significantly changed their basic positions. That they feel compelled to move at all, however, is a tribute to the way the Central American peace plan devised by Costa Rica's President Oscar Arias Sanchez has altered the game. The two principal adversaries can no longer simply sit back glowering across the board at one another.

For his part, Ortega had long insisted that he would discuss nothing with the senior Contra leadership. Why talk to the clowns, he had asked, rather than to the owner of the circus, the United States?

But once having accepted the Arias plan and the cease-fire it called for, Ortega was caught up in its logic and momentum. How, after all, can one bring about a cease-fire without discussing details with the other side? And so Ortega came around to say, yes, he would negotiate those matters and those matters only with the Contra leadership--but on an indirect basis, with Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo as the intermediary.

On Friday, in fact, he did just that. He met with the cardinal--and House Speaker Jim Wright (D-Tex.)--in Washington and indicated that the indirect negotiations should begin immediately. Ortega offered an 11-point proposal for a monthlong cease-fire that Obando y Bravo was to present to the Contras. At the same time, he said he wanted the indirect negotiations to continue in Washington--something Contra leaders have already rejected. This is hardly a major shift, but enough to keep Nicaragua in compliance with the Arias plan.

Reagan had simulated movement in his speech to last Monday's meeting of Organization of American States foreign ministers by announcing that if the Sandinistas in fact got down to serious negotiations with the Contras, the United States would then be willing to enter into discussions with representatives of all the Central American governments, including Nicaragua's.

At first blush, this seemed to offer something new. Sources in the State Department subsequently made clear, however, that to be considered "serious," the negotiations would have to address a broader agenda--i.e., some form of power-sharing--and that while they might begin on an indirect basis, they would have to end up as direct talks between the Sandinistas and the Contras.

In other words, there was nothing really new in the Reagan announcement. The United States has always said it would talk to the Sandinistas, but only after they have entered into direct negotiations with the Contras. The Sandinistas have just as consistently refused to do that. Predictably, they refused again.

While all this posturing around the question of direct negotiations may have its comedic undertones, the issue is one of deadly serious proportions. As the Sandinistas understand, the Reagan Administration's insistence that they negotiate directly with the Contras is a function of its strategy to get rid of them. Should they accept the Contras as valid interlocutors and sit down to discuss internal political arrangements with them, they would in effect extend them belligerent rights and at the same time undermine their own legitimacy--perhaps fatally so. Precisely because of that, the Arias plan does not call for such negotiations or otherwise contemplate power-sharing. As a Costa Rican spokesman phrased it last week, "That is not allowed. Under the accord, all governments are legitimate."

Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration hasn't yet accepted that logic. It is still trying to maneuver the Sandinistas into committing suicide.

In his own address to the OAS last Wednesday, Ortega strove to place the onus squarely back on the United States. His government, he said, would fully comply with the Arias plan provided the Reagan Administration immediately ceased its aggressive Contra war against Nicaragua. If it failed to do so, then Nicaragua would not be bound by the accord and might again resort to such measures as closing La Prensa, the principle opposition newspaper. The outcome was not entirely up to the United States. Ortega also scathingly criticized Reagan for not living up to earlier promises to negotiate directly with Managua. Although White House spokesmen quickly denied that any such commitment had been made, the fact is that the peace plan proposed by Reagan and Speaker of the House Wright last August did provide for direct talks between Washington and Managua.

But after attacking Reagan so strongly, Ortega adopted a more conciliatory tone in reiterating his readiness to meet with the President if that would help the cause of peace. Not only that, but the President could invite Adolfo Calero and other Contra leaders to sit in on the meeting.

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