The recent Angolan truce reached in Zaire is the second breakthrough in southern Africa in the past six months. The first was a tripartite agreement among Angola, Cuba and South Africa that opened the way for Namibian independence later this year and the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. This agreement, brokered by the Reagan Administration, is being implemented; more than 10,000 Cuban troops have already left Angola and South Africa has started its exit from Namibia.
The Angolan peace accord, however, was reached without American help; in fact, Washington was caught off guard since its new policy toward Angola was still being formulated under old assumptions of war. The current struggle over a new U.S. policy on Angola centers on whether Washington should use carrots or sticks to facilitate the peace process.
The Bush Administration is in danger of capitulating to right-wing forces in Congress who myopically still view Angola in Cold War terms and therefore want to continue and escalate military support to the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels, led by Jonas Savimbi, who have fought the government for almost 15 years.
Yet, despite attempts in the East and West to impose a Cold-War view on the struggle for power in Angola, the truth is that ideology is the least salient factor in explaining why Angolans formed not one but three nationalist movements: MPLA, (the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola); the defunct FNLA, (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA. Regional and ethnic factors have been infinitely more important.
Immediately following independence, the three Angolan parties engendered enthusiasm with their slogans, songs, martyrs and heroes. As time has passed, however, none of the parties were able to deliver either peace or prosperity to their adherents. Cynicism and alienation have replaced the initial partisan fervor.
Now, as the MPLA and UNITA begin face-to-face discussions as a result of the peace accord, each party appears to be experiencing more internal divisions and to have less political coherence than at any time since Angolan independence in 1975. With rare exceptions, none of the members of the first MPLA cabinet or political bureau is still in a position of power in the government or party. Adherence to Marxist doctrines no longer appears to drive the selection or promotion of individuals in the MPLA government or party. Moreover, no ideology seems to have clearly emerged as a substitute for Marxism. Pragmatism--and Dos Santos' attempt to balance diverse interest groups--apparently explain the rise and fall of MPLA officials.
Dos Santos is still the most respected member of the party hierarchy and even some of those whom he has fired speak highly of his intelligence, diligence and political acumen. Yet increasingly he appears to be isolated, without a stable inner group of close advisers. Perhaps the most biting criticism of Dos Santos is that he predicates major decisions on the achievement of consensus--leading to paralysis in many sectors, especially the economy.
On the other hand, UNITA's internal problems appear to be far more serious than those of the MPLA. Savimbi's incarceration of one of the top four UNITA leaders last December may well have exacerbated schisms in the party beyond repair. In recent years, rumors of serious divisions within UNITA have frequently circulated. One schism was said to be generational, with the younger UNITA generation demonstrating impatience and hostility toward Savimbi. Dozens of UNITA dissidents in Europe during the past 18 months have published articles and appeared on American, British and Portuguese television suggesting that Savimbi had become erratic, paranoid, and arbitrary. More and more observers condemned what was seen as Savimbi's growing tendency to torture and/or murder UNITA officials who threatened his total control over the party.
While the Soviets and Cubans have been turning away from military to diplomatic solutions in Angola, many in Washington are developing an appetite for a good fight in Angola. In Congress, conservative legislators are pushing the Administration's request to increase greatly the amount of lethal aid to UNITA to compensate for the loss of South African military support. U.S. representatives to the International Monetary Fund continued their futile effort in recent weeks to block Angolan membership. The State Department's initial reaction to the peace accord was to make clear that "we will continue our aid to UNITA until there is a national reconciliation."
The most important reason why the conflicting sides agreed to peace in Angola is that they are tired of the killing and the destruction. Outside powers, like the United States, should therefore encourage peaceful solutions rather than prolonging the suffering.
Fortunately there is time for Washington to rethink and relinquish its old posture in order to join others in bringing peace to Angola.