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Bring Home the GI's From South Korea

The Soviet Union and China no longer threaten, and Seoul is more than able to defend itself against the North.

COLUMN LEFT/ ROBERT L. BOROSAGE

July 11, 1993|ROBERT L. BOROSAGE, \o7 Robert L. Borosage is director of the Campaign for New Priorities and a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies. \f7

American forces guarding Korea's bleak 38th Parallel provided the White House with a classic backdrop for the end of President Clinton's first foreign journey. Here was a chance for the President to look "muscular," as one aide put it, while reasserting America's commitment to its loyal ally.

But the President's plans for Korea send a very different message. In a trip the President said was about "crafting our future," Korea illustrates that his foreign policy is still hostage to Cold War commitments from the past.


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The President pledged that the American presence, currently numbering 60,000 soldiers and dependents, would remain in Korea, standing vigilant against the Northern threat, as American forces have done since the Korean War ended in 1953.

But why keep the policy the same when the world has changed? President Truman sent American forces to defend Korea because the communist assault on the South was viewed as a Soviet test of American resolve, a warning sign on the road to world war. The troops stayed after the Korean War to enforce the containment of the Soviet Union and China.

Now, 40 years later, the Soviet Union is no more. China is the newest darling of global corporations. The impoverished, backward communist monarchy of Kim Il Sung is isolated and on the verge of collapse.

South Korea surely is able to defend itself against the North, having twice the population and more than 10 times the gross domestic product as its neighbor. In recent years, Seoul has modernized its military, outspending its rival by 2 to 1. South Korea now fields a modern military force of 633,000 soldiers renowned for their brutality in combat. Its air force, with more than 400 modern combat aircraft, is far more advanced than North Korea's outmoded planes, more than half of which are antique leftovers from the 1950s. With no great power backing the North, why are U.S. forces still in the South?

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that U.S. taxpayers spend approximately $20,000 per soldier each year to maintain the 35,000 on active duty in Korea. Simply removing and demobilizing the 2nd Infantry Division would save more than $5 billion in the next five years. But the continued commitment to Korea costs far more than that. The United States deploys an Army division and two air wings in Korea. It also commits three aircraft-carrier battle groups to keep a carrier on call in the Northern Pacific at all times. Clinton's new military policy demands the capacity to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously--say, in Korea and the Persian Gulf. Taking all that into account, experts like William Kaufmann, defense planner in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, estimate that the commitment to defend South Korea from the North may cost us as much as $60 billion a year.

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