The Peace Process After the Gulf Crisis

What is needed to make the peace process work is to obtain Palestinian compliance with past commitments within the Oslo agreements and not seek new Israeli concessions that go beyond the Oslo process. Last August, the head of Israeli military intelligence, Major Gen. Moshe Yaalon, concluded that Arafat had not "conceded for a single day the use of terrorism and violence as a legitimate means for achieving Palestinian national aims."

Indeed, if Arafat calculates that he has made tangible gains, despite his noncompliance, then violence against Israel will continue to plague the Oslo process in the future.

The Iraq crisis will leave its impact on the parties as they reengage in negotiations. Voices in the Arab world argue that there is a double standard by which the U.N. deals more harshly regarding Security Council resolutions on Iraq than with resolutions on Israel. Of course, resolutions on Iraq deal with aggression and were applied after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and in the aftermath of its repeated use of chemical weapons. Israel's resolutions affect disputed territories taken in a defensive war in 1967 when Israel was encircled by massing armies.

Israel's confidence in the Palestinians has been shaken by repeated calls for an Iraqi missile attack on Tel Aviv at demonstrations organized by Arafat's own Fatah organization. Israelis were shocked to learn on March 6 that former terrorists have been recruited into the Palestinian security services and continued to assist in the most recent bombing attacks of last year in Jerusalem.

Peace is still possible. But the best way for the parties to break the impasse in the peace process is for them to proceed as quickly as possible to permanent status negotiations. Unfortunately, the Palestinian Authority is banking on a strategy of constant crisis, under the assumption that a sustained impasse will produce international pressure on Israel alone. It would be tragic if the U.N., the European Union or others allow themselves to be manipulated by this tactic instead of insisting that Arafat get back to the negotiating table. Israel is seeking what has been the long-term aim of every defense minister since 1967: defensible borders to its east. Israel is willing to take risks for peace to make it work; but it must be certain that a genuine belief in nonviolence and reconciliation exists on the other side.