Iran's parliamentary elections next week are probably the most consequential in the Islamic Republic's history. It is widely assumed that the results will determine the course of Iran's foreign policy and, in particular, prospects for a more serious and sustained U.S.-Iran dialogue, if not rapid reconciliation.
Western analysts have cast Iran's political contest in stark terms of a dualistic battle between forces of light and darkness, respectively represented by so-called reformists and conservatives. But over-simplifying issues and forces in Iran's politics and basing predictions about its future course on the election outcome has reached unreasonable levels.
There is risk that if there is anything less than a resounding victory for the groups clearly and openly identified with President Mohammad Khatami, any possibility of significant change in Iran in the foreseeable future would be dismissed and efforts to establish a dialogue with the U.S. would be abandoned or at least put into an even lower gear.
To avoid such an outcome, it is essential to understand deeper developments in Iran, beginning with the diversity of views and interests within the so-called reformist and conservative factions.
Neither is homogeneous. Indeed, the conservative coalition has within it elements that were considered reformist from the late 1980s until the mid-1990s, both in economic and social issues and in foreign policy. Meanwhile, the left of the 1980s and '90s opposed any moderation of Iran's confrontational foreign policy, especially toward the United States.
However, since 1989, the left was kept out of government and did not benefit financially from the reconstruction boom of the early 1990s. It thus underwent a change and began supporting both reform and Khatami's bid for president. In foreign policy, the main goals of these former leftists is to reduce tensions between Iran and other countries.
These shifts underscore that interpreting the outcome of Iran's elections simply in terms of old stereotypes could lead to false conclusions about the country's future. Indeed, a reformist agenda can still be carried out even without total victory for the so-called reformist camp, provided that the left abandons its politics of revenge.
Further, in judging Iran's future directions, emphasis should be put on more basic changes taking place and the adjustments that they will demand from political leaders.
The following are most important:
