Flying a routine drug surveillance mission, the CIA-run Citation's radar first detects the missionary plane at 9:40 a.m., heading from Brazil toward Peru. The Peruvian liaison officer on board soon radios his command post at Pucallpa to see if the plane had filed a flight plan. None is found.
At 10:04, the Citation pilot asks the Peruvian in apparent surprise if an A-37 interceptor has taken off. Moments later, the American pilot expresses his first doubt. "We have not declared it suspect," he says. "I'm a little nervous about this."
He radios the American ground commander in Pucallpa. But after a brief discussion, the pilot decides that he won't fly up to see the plane's identifying tail number. "The problem is . . . if he's dirty and he detects us, he makes a right turn immediately [across the border] and we can't chase him."
"Roger that . . . I would stay covert for the time being and let's see what the A-37s do," comes the reply.
Moments later, with the A-37 already aloft, the American pilot warns the Peruvian liaison on the intercom: "See, I don't know if this is bandito or it's amigo, OK?" Maybe the plane will land, the pilot adds. "OK? Before brrrr, you know?" making the sound of a machine gun.
According to the report, the Peruvian "did not understand this message."
By 10:17, the pilot tells the co-pilot that the Cessna's high altitude and steady course don't match the profile of a drug runner. He repeats his doubts several times throughout the flight.
"From then on, attempts by both the U.S. crew of the Citation and the [Peruvian liaison] to understand what each was trying to say about the intercepted aircraft were not understood because of the stressful situation and language problems prevailing on board," the report says.
Under a three-phase process, the Peruvian air force is supposed to radio the suspect aircraft first. The liaison does so for the first time at 10:36. He orders the Cessna to head immediately for Pucallpa. "If you do not obey, we will go ahead and shoot you down," he warns in Spanish on a VHF channel.
But Donaldson, the missionary pilot, is using HF radio, which has a longer range, so he can communicate with his wife at the mission center. The missionaries hear nothing from the Citation, nor do they hear three radio calls from the A-37.
At 10:40, the Peruvians move to Phase 2: the A-37 fires two bursts of warning shots, including tracers. But the jet fires from behind at an upward angle and the missionaries don't see the shots.
A minute later, the Peruvian officer is informed that the commanding air force general in Lima has authorized Phase 3: attack.
At virtually the same time, the Citation pilot again tells the liaison officer in English that the Cessna is not trying to escape. "What?" comes the confused reply.
At 10:45, the liaison authorizes the A-37 gunner to fire. "I think we're making a big mistake," the U.S. pilot says softly on the intercom. Three minutes later, the Cessna is down.
