OMAHA — The few weeks remaining before winter grips Afghanistan could bring the collapse of largely Pushtun Taliban control in much of northern and western Afghanistan. But if history is any predictor, the Taliban's fall will not come strictly from military losses.
In 1992, entire communist-controlled regions in this same area fell rapidly, as Afghan factions defected en masse to support local, non-Pushtun, moujahedeen. The moujahedeen liberator of Kabul in April 1992 was Northern Alliance Tajik commander Ahmed Shah Masoud. His principal ally was Uzbek Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, who had fought under the Soviets and Afghan communists against the moujahedeen for nine years. Dostum's dramatic defection to Masoud in early 1992 changed the balance of power in the north, dooming the Soviet-supported communist regime in Kabul. Dostum is back today, opposing the Taliban and directing the anti-Taliban assault against Mazar-i-Sharif, the largest city in northern Afghanistan.
If 1992 is any precedent, anti-Taliban forces (dominated by members of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara ethnic groups) will again sweep through the non-Pushtun northern regions, assisted by U.S. air strikes and special forces. The first province--Ghor--fell to the moujahedeen commander Ismail Khan on Oct. 11. Mazar-i-Sharif, despite a recent setback, is likely to be next. Herat, located near the Iranian border, Tolaqan and Konduz will eventually all slip from Taliban control. The Northern Alliance and Hazara forces from the west could be positioned to occupy Kabul as early as the end of the year.
The entire Taliban leadership, however, is Pushtun, as is approximately 40% of Afghanistan's population. Victory for the international coalition attempting to uproot the Muslim extremist network in Afghanistan will not be assured unless the anti-Taliban wind also sweeps through the Pushtun areas south of Kabul.
This won't be easy. One possible scenario is that the Taliban will abandon Kabul and fall back to Kandahar in the Pushtun heartland. Pro-Taliban Pakistani religious parties, and perhaps factions in the Pakistani military, may prolong the Taliban's staying power in Afghanistan's southern Pushtun belt. Demonstrations organized by Pakistan's "jihadi" parties would continue unabated in northern Pakistan's Pushtun areas, attracting Pakistani recruits to join the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces inside Afghanistan. The current cooperative stance of the Pakistani leadership might begin to erode, as powerful pro-Pushtun constituencies in Pakistan's political-military-religious establishment consider ways to resist non-Pushtun control of Afghanistan. Should something like this scenario emerge, the U.S. assault on the international extremist Muslim network in Afghanistan could last well into next year or longer.
