TAIPEI, Taiwan — The 90-mile-wide Taiwan Strait has long been a potential danger zone, a lingering divide of the Cold War era that separates Communist China from democratic Taiwan.
Now the narrow body of water is taking on an added dimension, one that could answer one of the most intriguing political questions of today's globalized world: Can trade reduce the potential for war?
Rarely have two political adversaries embraced each other with such enthusiasm commercially against a backdrop of conceivable armed conflict.
Beijing, which views Taiwan as an inherent and historical part of China, wants the island integrated with the mainland--sooner rather than later and, if necessary, by force.
Taiwan, which over the years has evolved into a thriving democracy, wants none of it. But the island does want a piece of China's rapid industrial growth. In fact, many now argue that Taiwan can't survive as a player in the world economy without it.
Beijing happily takes Taiwanese investment, estimated cumulatively at between $45 billion and $70 billion, because it helps fuel the economic growth China desperately needs to continue its transformation into a modern market economy. It also dovetails with Beijing's political agenda of integrating Taiwan into the mainland.
And so, especially over the last 18 months, commercial ties have mushroomed.
Just what this means for the future of relations between Beijing and Taipei is a hotly debated issue, especially in the Taiwanese capital. Some believe that the trade ties signal the end of Taiwan's freedom; others are convinced that the opposite is true.
"It's really hard to say at this stage where it's all going," acknowledged Arthur Ding, a scholar at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taipei. "Everyone's studying it, [and] everyone draws different conclusions."
Kenneth Lieberthal, who oversaw China policy in the Clinton White House, believes that stronger commercial links don't imply Taiwan's political integration with China but do make it more difficult for Taipei to make any move toward independence.
"It makes the cost of radical action higher and therefore inevitably increases caution," he said.
There also are compelling issues for the United States. For example, some of the world's biggest high-tech production centers are moving from Taiwan, a de facto U.S. ally, to mainland China, a country initially labeled by the Bush administration as a "strategic competitor."
