There is more at stake in the world's response to the nuclear weapons ambitions of Iraq, Iran and North Korea than the nuclear future of these countries alone. At risk is the legal bulwark against nuclear proliferation in general: the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Current events put this treaty in jeopardy not simply because of the actions of these three "violators" but also because the options available to defeat them are so onerous.
With more than 180 parties, the nonproliferation treaty is one of the most widely adhered to international agreements. Though the agreement allows for International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring, it lacks a compliance mechanism.
As a result, the international community is at a loss on how to respond when violations occur. There appear to be five options, all of which challenge the future of this important treaty. They are diplomatic and economic pressure, nuclear containment, attacks on nuclear facilities, regime change and uncontested proliferation.
Diplomatic pressure, coupled with economic sanctions, has been tried and found wanting. They have failed to move the violators. Economic incentives under the 1994 Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang also failed.
In fairness, diplomacy can be frustratingly slow. In time, arguably, it may still succeed. But its track record provides little confidence. Rather, the violators have used diplomacy simply to buy time to pursue their nuclear ambitions. Purported nonproliferation allies also used the time to abet the violators. Pakistan and China helped North Korea, Russia assisted Iran, and German companies conducted nuclear business with Iraq.
Nuclear containment is a second option. This strategy would concede the nuclearization of the violators. In response, it would resurrect the Cold War strategy of making U.S. nuclear weapons more visible. This would include the reintroduction of American nuclear bombs into South Korea and placement in Gulf states. However, we ought not place too much confidence in this course of action. Consider: During the superpower era, nuclear crises over Berlin, Cuba and the Middle East nearly resulted in the nuclear catastrophe nuclear deterrence sought to avoid.
Containment generates another risk. Cold War adversaries never conveyed nuclear weapons to terrorists. The nuclear violators, by contrast, may be less inhibited.
