WASHINGTON — After a year of internal divisions and military diversions, serious planning is underway within the Bush administration for a campaign against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
The administration expects to complete a long-delayed Iraq policy review by the time Vice President Dick Cheney makes his nine-nation Mideast tour next month, so that he can outline American plans to Arab leaders, according to senior U.S. officials.
Any denouement in Iraq is still a long way off, the officials insist. But the broad outlines of favored options have begun to emerge.
At the heart of administration policy are two strategic decisions, according to the officials, who do not want to be identified while the policy review is underway.
First, the Iraq problem has to be solved, not simply managed as it was during the previous two U.S. administrations. The philosophy of so-called containment, or limiting the damage Hussein could do either to the region or at home, is no longer considered enough.
Many analysts, including former Clinton administration officials, now argue that it may even be dangerous to simply contain Iraq, because the regime has enough wiggle room to quietly work on weaponry that would allow it to pull off devastating surprises down the road.
Second, Washington is prepared to push beyond the limitations imposed by international sentiment, Arab public opinion and even the original U.N. resolutions that opened the way for Operation Desert Storm 11 years ago to force Iraq out of tiny oil-rich Kuwait.
Having survived short-lived opposition to the campaign in Afghanistan, U.S. officials express a new confidence about going up against what is still a strong tide of resistance.
The debate continues, however, about what to do next. But the administration's mind-set and the progress of the war in Afghanistan, especially compared with the decade-long Soviet struggle there in the 1980s, have opened the way for new thinking about what might work.
As policymakers deliberate the options, three basic scenarios are emerging:
* The diplomatic route, working through the United Nations to pass new "smart sanctions" and press Hussein's regime to allow the return of inspectors who would look for and dismantle any chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
* A military campaign, probably relying heavily on air power and potential defections within the Iraqi military.
* A tightening of the political noose around Hussein's government with more coercive actions by neighboring states and the international community.
The policy may well end up with some mix of these approaches. But the common denominator behind each is the threat of some kind of military action should Iraq not change its ways. Despite opposition from allies, a major U.S. military effort is no longer out of the question, U.S. officials say.
"There's an evolving consensus that a sizable U.S. military activity will be required," a well-placed source said.
Even Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, long the most cautious voice among the principals crafting policy on Iraq, is on board. At two congressional hearings last week, he put the world on notice that President Bush is exploring "the most serious set of options that one might imagine" that will leave "no stone unturned."
The ultimate goal: a change of regimes--and sooner rather than later.
"After the president, Powell now looks like the hardest-line person in the administration," mused a senior State Department official Friday.
The policy review is exploring the possibility of new anti-Hussein opposition inside and outside Iraq, U.S. officials say. Consensus is growing on broadening the makeup of the U.S.-funded Iraqi National Congress, or INC, and encouraging the coalition to find new leadership.
"The INC could still be a useful umbrella to bring other political forces together, but not as it is currently constituted. We need an INC that is more representative of all the forces in Iraq," a senior administration official said.
INC chief Ahmad Chalabi still has support from some quarters, notably at the Pentagon, but "that is not where policy is currently headed," the official added.
Since last year, Pentagon political appointees have advocated using the INC in the same way the American military used Afghan opposition forces, backed by U.S. Special Forces troops, to battle the Taliban. But key officials at the State Department and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain skeptical about the INC's military capabilities.
The INC, and the CIA station that supported it, was forced out of northern Iraq by Hussein's troops in 1996. Since then, the INC has been headquartered in London and unable to make any serious challenges at home.
"I don't see us drawing up operations with the INC as it would take too long to build it up as a fighting force," said the well-placed source.
