WASHINGTON — One word at the center of debate over the first American war against Iraq has been conspicuously absent in the political jostling over a possible rematch: Vietnam.
When Congress authorized the 1991 Persian Gulf War, many critics--and even some supporters--warned that the face-off with Iraq could become another Vietnam "quagmire," with massive U.S. casualties.
Now, even most of those dubious of invading Iraq on diplomatic grounds are optimistic about the military outlook. As Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), a leading skeptic, wrote recently, "There is ... no question about our capacity to win militarily, and perhaps to win easily."
So prevalent is the assumption that the United States could depose Iraqi President Saddam Hussein at relatively low cost that when Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard B. Myers testified before Congress last week, they faced only a few questions about what the war might entail--and satisfied legislators with answers couched in the broadest generalities.
Such is the fruit of a string of U.S. military interventions--from the Gulf War through Afghanistan--that have brought success with extraordinarily low levels of U.S. casualties.
During the debate about the Persian Gulf War "there was still the Vietnam hangover," said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.). "There was a fear we might be enmeshed in another quagmire. That concern has now been eradicated."
Indeed, the soaring confidence in the military has carried the country into what might be called the post-post-Vietnam era.
In 1991, still in the long shadow of this country's painful loss in Southeast Asia, Congress wrestled with two questions: Should the United States go to war against Iraq, and could it do so at an acceptable cost. Today, with virtually all sides assuming the answer to the second question is yes, the nation is left debating only whether it should intervene.
In this conflict and beyond, many analysts say, the elimination of the fear of failure or unacceptable levels of casualties means the United States is more likely to use force. But it also could lead to shock, and perhaps even rapid disillusionment, among the public if a second Iraq war produces a surprisingly high level of American deaths--a possibility some analysts don't rule out, especially if a cornered Hussein uses chemical or biological weapons.
