WASHINGTON — Leading up to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Pentagon advertised that it had a strategy to stun the Iraqi leadership into rapid submission -- "shock and awe." The strategy combined a massive bombing campaign centered on Baghdad with a lightning-quick dash by coalition ground forces from Kuwait to the Iraqi capital. Although the performance of coalition ground and air forces has been extraordinary by any measure, and the numbers of smart bombs and weapons used unprecedented, the Iraqi regime hadn't collapsed. Iraqi resistance, in and out of uniform, remained strong.
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Fair Test?
Shifting goals required a change in strategy, but that doesn't mean the 'shock and awe' concept was flawed
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If the shock-and-awe strategy hasn't lived up to expectations, when will it? Why was it a key ingredient in the U.S. war plan in the first place? If it proves unsuccessful, is shock and awe a flawed concept, or is it being misapplied in Iraq?
As principal author and co-chairman of the group -- composed also of James Wade and retired four-star officers L.A. "Bud" Edney, Fred M. Franks, Charles A. Horner and Jonathan T. Howe -- that conceived, in the late 1990s, the shock-and-awe concept and the parallel strategy of rapid dominance, I do not consider these to be academic questions. The answers require an understanding of how the shock-and-awe approach of Army Gen. Tommy Franks and his Central Command staff compares with our group's.
The original contingency war plan was an updated variant of Desert Storm that relied on overwhelming force to destroy the Iraqi military. But both Franks and Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld were dissatisfied with the long build-up time and large number of forces needed to implement the plan. Furthermore, since the 1991 Gulf War, the technological advances of U.S. firepower have increased America's military advantage over Iraq up to fivefold, and the extraordinary success in ending Taliban rule in Afghanistan using minimal U.S. forces surely built Pentagon confidence that a new plan could be developed to exploit the U.S. edge in fighting power.
Franks was asked to come up with the plan that would exploit our overwhelming firepower advantage and bring about the collapse of Iraqi resistance as quickly as possible. The principal war aims were to depose and disarm Saddam Hussein.
There were also some important political goals.
