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The Iraq Dilemma: Do it Right or Quick?

NEWS ANALYSIS

December 28, 2003|Doyle McManus and Sonni Efron, Times Staff Writers

Some critics say that the Pentagon is trying to fight the war with too few troops, stretching the Army and Marine Corps and giving insurgents false hope of an early withdrawal. "I'd put more troops in now, in a hurry," Scowcroft said. "The more troops you have, the quicker you can change the climate."

* Making a deal with the Shiites:


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A major stumbling block has been Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the nation's most influential Shiite leader. Sistani has rejected the plan to hold caucuses to select the new government. He has insisted that only a government chosen by direct elections will be legitimate. The U.S. and its allies are adamant that there isn't enough time before the June 30 handover to conduct a census, register voters and organize political parties, without which a legitimate election cannot be held.

The stalemate, if not resolved quickly, puts the United States in the awkward position of trying to force a political process that is not entirely democratic, possibly further hurting its image in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. Behind the scenes, Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, is trying to arrange a compromise acceptable not just to Sistani but also to the Governing Council and other Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni leaders.

"It can't be just cutting a deal with Sistani," a senior State Department official said last week. "He may represent a very significant political force among the major groups, but it won't hold Iraq together if we just cut a deal with him."

Still, the mechanics of the 18 caucuses slated to select the new government haven't been worked out either.

"It has to be seen as legitimate not only in the eyes of the world, but especially in the eyes of the Iraqis," the official said. "It has to be a government they're willing to invest in."

* Including the Sunnis:

To create a legitimate government, Bremer also will have to involve the alienated, angry and fearful Sunni population.

The minority Sunnis, who were dominant under Saddam Hussein's rule, are now most identified in American minds as the inhabitants of the hostile Sunni Triangle. And because so many middle-class Sunnis joined the Baath Party under Hussein -- a necessity for career enhancement -- a large portion of the Sunni elite is now ineligible to participate in politics under a coalition decree barring ex-Baathists from public office.

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