Making decisions to act on such evidence -- sending troops and planes into battle, giving weapons inspectors more time, opting for a cunning diplomatic maneuver -- is what leaders do, from Powell and President Bush on down.
Between intelligence and policy lies a no-man's land. In a perfect world, intelligence would supply decision-makers with incontrovertible facts. But in the real world, even in the ultrasophisticated, high-tech world of the U.S. intelligence community, that kind of "fact" is scarce. What must be relied on instead is interpretation.
Some members of the intelligence community already express skepticism about the specifics Powell used to make his case, questioning the strength of the information pointing to a "terrorist poison and explosives factory" with links to both Baghdad and Al Qaeda.
Is Powell being duped? Since Sept. 11, it has become more and more apparent that the president and his inner circle possess what they think is incontrovertible evidence linking Al Qaeda and Iraq. They believe this evidence shows active plotting is underway to attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction. War, it follows, is necessary to defend the U.S.
What drives this chain of reasoning are raw intelligence data showing a regime determined to deceive. Viewed in the framework of Hussein's evil record and the well-documented existence of a global terrorist network, the administration's conclusions are not irrational. Indeed, they may prove to be correct.
We must understand, however, that even the best intelligence agencies in the world have not rescued the Bush administration from the uncertainties of a difficult decision.
The administration is free to add my small photograph to the pile of evidence, but the real lesson of the picture of the "baby-milk factory" is that then -- as now -- intelligence data is just that: data. They cannot tell us which course to take.
