A letter from the International Atomic Energy Agency to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1997 details interviews with agents from Mukhabarat, Baghdad's secret service, who described Iraq's clandestine nuclear program, code-named the Petrochemical-3 project. The agents said that "PC-3 had adopted a policy of avoiding foreign assistance, believing that the risk of exposure (e.g. through 'sting' operations) far outweighed the likely technical benefits."
In 1998, Pakistan's government investigated the middleman's letter at the IAEA's request and declared the offer a fraud. The nuclear agency concluded that charges of Pakistani proliferation were "inconsistent with the information available," but it listed the memo as a key unresolved issue in a 1999 U.N. report on Iraq's arms programs. Iraq's recent 12,000-page arms declaration referred twice to the "unsolicited offer."
"The memo was taken quite seriously," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington and a former nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq. "There's this pattern of leakage out of Pakistan. These people broke almost every country's law to get their own nuclear components."
Nuclear Chief's Ouster
In March 2001, Musharraf removed Khan as head of Pakistan's nuclear programs and named him a presidential advisor -- a move that nation's nuclear hero heard about on television and at first refused to accept.