As recently as two weeks ago, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, called the guerrilla attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq "strategically and operationally insignificant."
Insignificant? Actually, it is difficult to identify any military or political objectives that the guerrillas are not making real progress toward achieving.
The insurgents have successfully struck a blow at coalition military forces. According to an extensive survey by Stars and Stripes, 49% of troops reported that their unit's morale was low or very low.
Friendly governments, like Japan's, have either delayed their troop commitments or, like the Italians, are debating their current commitments.
And there are indications that the ranks of the insurgents are swelling with every successful strike against U.S. forces and other targets.
The guerrillas have successfully delayed the reconstruction and economic recovery of Iraq and substantially raised the costs of these efforts. Recurring attacks on miles of unguarded Iraqi pipelines have continued to impair the coalition's ability to improve the vital flow of oil out of the country.
Also, as a result of direct attacks on their offices and personnel as well as the absence of security generally, the 15 largest aid agencies, including the Red Cross, have been driven out of Iraq.
Finally, the insurgents have achieved political success by properly appreciating that the "center of gravity" is the will of the adversary.
Last week, the widely reported results of a top-secret CIA study indicated that Iraqis are losing faith in the U.S.-led occupation forces, resulting in increasing support for the resistance.
Also last week, after calling back to Washington the civilian administrator, L. Paul Bremer III, the Bush administration announced that it would transfer power to a provisional Iraqi government by June 2004.
Following on the heels of a string of guerrilla attacks and the disturbing results of the CIA study, it is a move that appears to be taken out of desperation. It took Afghan guerrillas almost 10 years to force the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Iraqi guerrillas could plausibly achieve the same result against the United States before the end of next year.
Sanchez's dismissive remark regarding the guerrillas reveals the contempt that conventional forces typically feel for guerrillas.
