Clark Wears Campaign Medals From Two Fronts

Berger acknowledged the tensions, but he insisted they were only natural when so much was at stake. "Inherent to the battlefield is a situation where the commander seeks to be somewhat more aggressive, in some respects .... Tell me a relationship between a field commander and the people back in headquarters that has not been somewhat laden with friction," Berger said. The Pentagon, he added, "over-imagined" how much secret contact there was between Clark and the White House.

Clark's approach to the war revealed his broader philosophy about the use of the military. He split from the post-Vietnam era view that force should be used in overwhelming measure, and only if all else had failed, a doctrine associated with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and former Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger.

Clark's view was that military force could be used in different degrees of intensity, in different situations, as one of the tools of foreign policy. "This distinguishes him from most of the post-Vietnam generals," said Ivo Daalder, who served as European specialist on the Clinton administration's National Security Council. "He sees force as one of the tools in the toolbox."

Daalder noted that as a key staffer on the Joint Chiefs, Clark was important in urging its chairman, John M. Shalikashvili, and others to agree in 1995 -- before the Kosovo intervention -- to the NATO bombing of Bosnia that helped drive the parties to the bargaining table.

Clark also believed in aggressively using the military on the ground, sometimes in an improvised fashion.

As NATO boss, he sometimes clashed with the U.S. Army generals who were leading the NATO "stabilization force" in Bosnia because he wanted them to be more aggressive in using military pressure to force Bosnians to change. He wanted to use the troops to accelerate resettlement of populations, to get local leaders to agree to creation of a multiethnic police force, and to pressure ethnic leaders.

On this, there was "pushback" from the field commanders, including Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, who went on to serve as Army chief of staff from 1999 to August. Shinseki feared going too far in using military force for "nation-building," said another general who worked with Clark during the Kosovo war. The relationship between Clark and Shinseki in Bosnia "was extremely strained."

Clark, said the general, "would take more risk -- he'd rely more on instinct than staff recommendations."