WASHINGTON — Last fall, delegations began shuttling between Washington and Jerusalem to discuss a secret Israeli proposal that would overturn decades of Middle East diplomacy: a U.S. recognition of Israel's claims to portions of the West Bank seized in the 1967 war and an acknowledgment that Palestinian refugees would never be able to exercise the "right of return" to lost land in Israel.
At least some U.S. officials were anxious. How would the Arab world, already inflamed, react? But by late February, word had come down from the Oval Office: President Bush wanted to break with his predecessors.
"The president said, 'Find a way to make it happen,' " said an official with a pro-Israel group close to the negotiations.
Last week, it did.
For a man who came to the presidency with little foreign policy experience, Bush has time and again embarked on bold policy initiatives, especially in the Middle East.
In his first year in office, he spoke openly about establishing a Palestinian state. He made that goal explicit with his peace plan, known as the "road map," which was unveiled last year on the eve of the Iraq war.
He did it again by calling for democratization of Arab countries throughout the region and proposing a "Greater Middle East Initiative" to promote reform.
And he argued that toppling Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would be a beacon of hope and democracy for the entire region.
Some hailed this latest action as a gutsy way to jump-start a peace process locked in a bloody stalemate for three years. Others condemned it as the United States overtly taking sides with Israel and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, undermining its traditional role as an impartial arbiter between the Jewish state and the Palestinians.
"The president prides himself on being blunt, and this is what we could call a blunt move," said James M. Lindsay, director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and coauthor of a book on Bush's foreign policy. "From the day he came into office, the president has always favored bold and risky initiatives where the gains are big if it pays off, and the losses are great if it doesn't."
The policy shift was announced as the Bush administration was scrambling to contain an upsurge in violence in Iraq, and many commentators worried that it could increase anti-American sentiment in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world. The Israeli assassination of Hamas leader Abdulaziz Rantisi on Saturday seemed only to presage more unrest.
But Flynt Leverett, who helped draft the administration's peace plan before leaving the National Security Council last year, said that for the Bush administration, the two policies -- on Israel and Iraq -- were on separate tracks.
Leverett said the administration made a decision that, despite expected expressions of Arab outrage, "was not going to significantly affect how much support they get or don't get on Iraq or other regional issues."
Lindsay said the decision went to the core of the way Bush and his closest advisors see the world -- that what is important in international relations is not what foreign governments say or think but what those governments do.
"For many of the president's advisors, ultimately, they believe in being powerful, demonstrating resolve and acting boldly; at looking not at what someone else says, but what are they willing to do or not do," Lindsay said.
Leverett said it had always been expected that in a final settlement, Israel would keep at least some part of the West Bank settlements. And all along, he said, it had been considered unlikely that Palestinian refugees and their descendants would be able to return to ancestral homes in what is now Israel.
"But why do you need to say that right now?" Leverett said. "What do you get out of that? In terms of mustering international support for your policy, you lose."
Bush's endorsement of Israel's plan, which includes its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, suggested to many that Palestinians were being left out of negotiations that, under the peace plan, were supposed to be a two-way street.
Leverett said he believed the administration's shift in policy was aimed partly at increasing electoral support for Bush. But the main motivation, he said, seemed to have been to bolster Sharon, who faces a referendum in his own Likud Party over the Gaza withdrawal.
It was not the first time the administration had changed policy to accommodate Sharon, said Leverett, who is now a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. Previously, the administration delayed release of the peace plan to avoid complicating Israeli elections. And Sharon aides played a significant role in drafting the Bush speech in 2002 that announced his two-state policy and called for a new Palestinian leadership.
"I think it was, once again, an effort to help Sharon politically," Leverett said.
The policy shift was in the works for seven months and took many twists and turns, Israeli and U.S. officials said.
