Global Nuclear Inquiry Stalls

Information implicating members of Khan's ring began to surface last December after Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi announced that he was giving up his efforts to build an atomic bomb. In a deal negotiated with the U.S. and Britain, Libya turned over evidence showing that Khan and his associates had sold at least $100 million worth of technology to Libya, including a nearly completed uranium enrichment plant to produce material for a bomb.

The disclosures revealed that Khan, regarded as the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, also had provided extensive assistance to Iran's nuclear program, dating back to the late 1980s.

Investigators from the IAEA and various police agencies have been trying to piece together the ring's operation, identifying middlemen and suppliers who contributed to what officials call the world's worst case of nuclear proliferation.

Individual countries are conducting their own criminal investigations, but the IAEA has sole responsibility for carrying out the worldwide effort to shut down the black market.

A handful of arrests have been made in Germany, Switzerland and South Africa. Law enforcement authorities also are investigating people in several other countries, including Britain, France and Spain.

Not everyone is eager for full disclosure, however.

Amid speculation that Khan may have operated with the knowledge or assistance of other high-ranking military officials in Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf pardoned Khan early this year and has refused to permit investigators from the IAEA or the United States to interview the scientist.

"Investigators are very keen to get direct access to [Khan], but I don't think it will ever happen," a Western diplomat said.

Similarly, Malaysia has blocked access to Khan's confidant, Dubai businessman Buhary Syed abu Tahir, who is being held in Kuala Lumpur. Hussein Haniff, Malaysia's ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna, said Tahir was being held under the country's Internal Security Act, which restricts access to him.

The case is politically sensitive in Malaysia. Tahir, who married into a prominent Malaysian family, had arranged for production of centrifuge components at a factory controlled by the prime minister's son.

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Risks From Delays

Such delays and obstacles compound fears of the IAEA inspectors that evidence will disappear, memories will fade and leads will turn out to be false. The agency, which is responsible for monitoring compliance with nuclear regulations, lacks the power to compel testimony or subpoena evidence.