What came afterward was far more difficult, and U.S. commanders over the last year have used what critics call a trial-and-error strategy against the insurgency, with varying degrees of success.
Immediately after the fall of Baghdad, U.S. commanders set their sights on capturing the biggest stars in the Baath Party constellation, creating the notorious deck of cards depicting the most wanted people from Hussein's regime. Brigades of the Army's 4th Infantry Division carried out raids throughout the so-called Sunni Triangle in search of Hussein loyalists such as Izzat Ibrahim, vice chairman of the Baath Party's Revolutionary Command Council.
The raids netted some important figures. Yet U.S. officials now concede that focusing too much on the top regime members did not have the expected impact on the insurgency.
"I think there was probably too great a willingness to believe that once we got the 55 people on the blacklist, the rest of those killers would stop fighting," Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz told Congress recently.
Defenders of American counterinsurgency efforts argue that the violence in Iraq over the last year is part of a calculated plan by members of Hussein's former regime, not the result of missteps by the U.S.-led occupation authority.
"It is the military and intelligence and secret police that never surrendered. And they are continuing the fight," said the senior administration official.
After a string of bombings last summer -- most significantly, the destruction of the United Nations compound in August -- U.S. commanders adopted a get-tough approach in central Iraq. Troops used barbed wire to encircle entire villages, including Al Auja, where Hussein was born. In November, the U.S. launched bombing raids on suspected insurgent hide-outs in Baghdad.
Ground troops scored successes during the period, developing better intelligence about the Baathist insurgents. The 4th Infantry Division drew up complex family trees of suspected party loyalists, ultimately leading to Hussein's capture in December.
With the new year, the Marines began developing a "velvet glove" strategy for their imminent deployment to the Sunni Triangle -- in contrast to the more confrontational approach of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division, which had responsibility for that area until March. Relying on the Marine Corps "Small Wars Manual," the 1st Marine Division planned to carry out more foot patrols in cities such as Fallouja and send Marine platoons into villages to live for extended periods. They also planned to shun the use of aerial bombardment or artillery.
