An anatomy of the deal, assembled from documents and interviews, shows in stark and mundane ways how the Khan network exploited international businessmen -- wittingly or unwittingly -- to fashion a web of commerce and intrigue that stretched across the globe.
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Encounter in Dubai
Gerhard Wisser was having a tough time finding new business in the Middle East for his engineering company. His fortunes took a dramatic turn during dinner at the home of a wealthy Arab in Dubai in late 1999.
Among the guests that night, Wisser has told police, were two men he knew from past business dealings.
One was Lerch. The two men had done business together when Lerch worked for a German manufacturer of vacuum pumps. They remained friends and occasional business partners.
The other acquaintance was Buhary Syed abu Tahir, then 40, a flamboyant Sri Lankan businessman who drove a Rolls-Royce and was living in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates.
Both Tahir and Lerch had ties to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In the 1980s, Lerch acknowledged supplying vacuum pumps and other equipment to Pakistan.
Tahir also helped Pakistan's secret nuclear effort and, by the mid-1990s, was coordinating the shipment of technology to Iran and managing Khan's dealings with Libya, according to a statement he later gave to Malaysian police.
A few minutes into the night's meal, Wisser recalled in his statement to South African police, Tahir asked whether Wisser's company could manufacture "certain pipe work systems" for an unnamed client.
Wisser's firm no longer made piping, but Tahir was not deterred. He offered a generous finder's fee if Wisser could find another company for the job.
Wisser was in the midst of what he called "a very ugly and costly divorce. I was therefore quite interested to follow the matter up and perhaps earn a good commission."
Tahir promised to obtain technical drawings for the system and have Lerch examine them before sending them to South Africa. Tahir said the piping was for a refinery in the United Arab Emirates.
"I couldn't quite believe it, but left it at that," Wisser said.
At the time, Iran and North Korea were no longer buying nuclear technology at their earlier pace and the Khan network was looking for ways to satisfy an eager new customer -- Libya.
Two years earlier, in 1997, Libyan officials had contacted Khan about helping their country's stalled efforts to build an atomic bomb. The result was a business arrangement called Project Machine Shop 1001.
