Because U.S. commanders no longer have carte blanche to run military operations inside Iraq, they must seek approval from interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who has his own political future to consider -- even though he owes his position to the U.S.
U.S. officials said Allawi had backed a broad plan to retake insurgent-controlled cities in Iraq before the January election. Allawi approved the recent successful U.S. offensive in Samarra, which U.S. commanders considered necessary only after a local government installed by Allawi buckled under constant attack by insurgents.
Yet there has been occasional friction between U.S. commanders in Baghdad and the Iraqi government that took power after the U.S.-led coalition handed over sovereignty June 28.
In August, top U.S. officers in Iraq and Pentagon officials were angry when Allawi ordered a halt to a day-old, U.S.-led offensive against Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada Sadr's militia as it holed up inside the sacred Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf.
Allawi called the cease-fire to allow time for negotiations with Sadr, which ultimately broke down. U.S. officials in Baghdad and Washington argued that such frictions were just part of a gradual process of reducing Iraq's dependence on the U.S. military.
"We made a deal, and that's what you get when you set up an interim government," a senior military official at the Pentagon said. "But the alternative is not recognizing them."
U.S. officials said the recent offensive operation in Samarra went more smoothly than they had expected, and has boosted optimism that more cities can be wrested from insurgent hands before January's election.
"People looked at Samarra and said, 'Wow, this works.' It wasn't nearly as difficult an operation as we had anticipated," the senior Defense official said. "After Samarra, we now believe we can do more."
Just weeks ago, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Army Gen. John P. Abizaid of U.S. Central Command began lowering expectations about how comprehensive the January vote would be, suggesting that some rebellious cities such as Fallouja might have to be left out of the balloting.
U.S. officers in Baghdad said that the biggest difference between the Samarra operation and the failed U.S. offensive in Fallouja in April was that select units of the Iraqi national guard held their ground under enemy fire. In April, the U.S.-trained Iraqi security forces in Fallouja capitulated soon after the U.S. offensive began.
