George F. Kennan, a leading authority on the Soviet Union who in the midst of the Cold War became a passionate crusader for the control and abolition of nuclear arms, has died. He was 101.
The historian and diplomat, who was best known as the architect of "containment," which became the cornerstone of U.S. policy in dealing with the Soviet Union for more than 40 years, died at home in Princeton, N.J.
Kennan was an elegant writer, the author of 26 books and numerous articles. He won the Pulitzer Prize for history and the National Book Award in 1956 for "Russia Leaves the War" and a second Pulitzer in 1967 for "Memoirs: 1925-1950."
Kennan was also a distinguished scholar and a professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton. He had been associated with the institute since 1950, much of the time with the title of permanent professor in the School of Historic Studies. Even late in life, Kennan looked the part of the diplomat: tall, slender, erect, balding and with a discreet mustache. He had a slightly ascetic appearance, and that, combined with an element of shyness, frequently caused him to appear aloof and a bit imperious.
Though Kennan was widely admired for his containment theory, it was to his immense annoyance and regret that it was his legacy.
Kennan's thoughts on the Soviet Union first drew attention in an 8,000-word telegram to the State Department that he prepared while serving as a member of the U.S. Embassy staff in Moscow. Written in February 1946, it became known in diplomatic lore as the Long Telegram.
The cable was broken into five sections, "all neatly divided, like an 18th century Protestant sermon," Kennan noted in his memoirs. The sections dealt with the basic features of the Soviet postwar outlook, the background of that outlook and its resulting impact on Soviet policy, both official and unofficial. It concluded with the implications of all this on American policy.
Kennan argued that the Soviets dismissed and held in contempt the idea that international agreements must be respected or given the stature of law. Josef Stalin and his negotiators, he believed, would invariably seek to turn all negotiations and treaties to their advantage and were unlikely to honor past agreements if they felt such treaties were not in their best interests.
In Kennan's view, this approach to foreign affairs had little to do with communism but reflected Russia's historical role in European politics.
