As evidence of the change, the pair noted that seven of the 10 most costly hurricanes in U.S. history occurred during the last two years. And they cited the recent announcement by a leading disaster modeling firm, Risk Management Solutions Inc. of Newark, Calif., that chances of devastating storms making landfall are dramatically higher than it previously predicted.
RMS executive vice president Paul VanderMarck said in an interview that the firm's decision to switch from using 100-year averages to looking at just the last five years in forecasting storms, and the resulting jump in its prediction of big storm losses along the East and Gulf coasts, was based solely on new scientific knowledge, for example on rising ocean temperatures, and the views of an expert panel.
But critics said that the change was the product of pressure from insurers seeking to justify rate hikes and that, in any case, it represented an unfair changing of the rules by the industry.
"The companies came in after the early 1990s disasters and told us, 'We're going to start using these long-term models that are going to have periods of intense activity and periods of no activity," said J. Robert Hunter, who was Texas insurance commissioner at the time and is now insurance director at the Consumer Federation of America. "They wanted us set the rates so that it would even things out across the highs and lows, and we agreed," Hunter said.
"Now they're coming back," he continued, "and saying 'Oops! We got it wrong; we're going to change the model.' That reneges on the deal."
The state's current commissioner, Mike Geeslin, had similar sentiments: "You have companies that say they have a plan to stay put year in and year out, and gather a large share of the market. Then they decide they have more risk than they can stomach."
The result, Geeslin said, is that the state must either "prop them up" with rate hikes and other concessions, or step in and take their place.
Industry executives offer a second argument for drastic change that goes well beyond altered weather patterns and focuses especially on the need for federal and state backup for insurers. They suggest that the combination of rapid real estate development and rising home prices so raise the risk of gargantuan loss in a hurricane that much of coastal America has become virtually uninsurable by private industry.
In a recent speech, Allstate Chief Executive Edward M. Liddy painted a vivid picture of how a tightly packed set of storms could erase first the profits, then potentially the financial stability, of an insurer in a quick blast.
"When Hurricane Andrew hit the coast of Florida in 1992," Liddy told a Washington audience in January, "it wiped out all of the profits Allstate ever made in the state from all lines of insurance over the course of our history.... And when four hurricanes hit in 2004, they wiped out all the profits from 1992 to 2004.
"That's not a viable economic proposition for a company," he told his audience. "It's not a viable economic proposition for an industry."
Without government backup, he seemed to be saying, Allstate and other companies would have little business reason to continue offering insurance of any sort.
But a quick check of Allstate's regulatory filings from the mid-1990s through 2004 showed that the insurer earned $6 billion more in premiums in Florida than it incurred in losses. Add to that the premium earnings for last year, and the total rises to more than $6.6 billion.
Asked about what happened to that sum, Allstate spokesman Mike Trevino responded: "What Mr. Liddy meant to say is that ... the four hurricanes wiped out all the profits Allstate earned from our homeowners line of business," not all lines.
Overall, the company made money.
