VIENNA — In stark contrast to U.S. allegations against Iraq three years ago that were based on secret intelligence, today's suspicions about Iranian nuclear ambitions draw on evidence made public by a U.N. agency, the same one that found no case against Saddam Hussein.
The information appears in a series of reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear monitoring arm, whose latest assessment of the material is due out early this week. The IAEA has credibility internationally as an impartial analyst, which may explain the greater consensus in the world community about the need for a concerted response to Iran.
"Since Iraq, who's going to believe intelligence? Who is going to believe anybody but a neutral agency?" said Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy, the Egyptian ambassador to Austria and a vice chair of the IAEA board of governors.
U.S. officials agree that the agency's role on Iran has been crucial.
"If the information comes from the inspectors on the ground, it is more readily acceptable.... I think there are very few governments that have any doubts about Iran's intentions at this point," said Robert Joseph, the undersecretary of State for nuclear nonproliferation.
When the Security Council gets Iran's case next month, it will base any decision about sanctions on the agency's reports, which show a concerted effort to enrich uranium and signs of interest in learning how to make and detonate a nuclear bomb.
Although the reports hardly provide proof that Iran seeks the capability to make a nuclear weapon, they describe a number of activities that are difficult to square with purely civilian intentions.
Iran has argued that nuclear-armed countries, such as the United States and Britain, are casting Tehran's behavior in the worst light to stop its efforts to advance by gaining sophisticated technology. But experts from many nations say that Iran's failure to disclose its nuclear program for 18 years to the IAEA, as required under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, casts doubt on Tehran's explanations. Western countries say their intelligence dovetails with the IAEA reports, and in some cases goes further.
In the months before the Iraq invasion, information about nuclear, chemical and biological weapons gathered by U.S. and British intelligence sources formed the case for going to war. It turned out that some of the evidence was fabricated and some just plain wrong.
