WASHINGTON — The CIA never developed an overall strategy for confronting Al Qaeda and let precious resources and capabilities go unused in the years leading up to the Sept. 11 attacks, according to an internal investigation that the agency had fought to keep secret for the last two years.
The report from the agency's inspector general, declassified Tuesday, adds disturbing new details to an already extensive public record of Sept. 11-related failures.
Among them was the revelation that long before the attacks, as many as 60 officers in the CIA had seen cables indicating that two Al Qaeda operatives -- who went on to reside in San Diego -- had entered the United States or possessed travel documents that would let them do so.
The report, which was completed in 2005, also made the case that former CIA Director George J. Tenet and other top officials should face further scrutiny within the agency to determine whether they should be reprimanded for having any roles in the breakdowns.
Tenet, who stepped down as CIA director in 2004, disputed the inspector general's report. "The IG is flat wrong," Tenet said in a statement released to reporters Tuesday.
Overall, the report concludes that there was neither a "single point of failure" nor a "silver bullet" that would have prevented the Sept. 11 attacks.
Nevertheless, the report says, the CIA and its senior officers "did not discharge their duties in a satisfactory manner."
The report contains new findings that the CIA diverted funds from counter-terrorism activities -- and failed to spend all of the money that was left -- even as Tenet and other agency officials were pleading for resources and expressing growing alarm about the terrorist threat.
The report concluded that the agency never produced a "comprehensive strategic assessment of Al Qaeda" and that officials allowed squabbling between agencies and among units within the CIA to undermine counter-terrorism cooperation. It let systems meant to keep terrorists out of the United States deteriorate so badly that "basically, there was no coherent, functioning watch-listing program" when 19 Al Qaeda operatives entered the country to hijack four jets.
Congress passed legislation this month that, among other things, required the agency to declassify the executive summary of the document. Even so, some text remained redacted, apparently to avoid revealing names of agency officials, operations, capabilities or resources.
