A road map out of Iraq

Second, the United States should announce that it is undertaking talks with Iraqi leaders to jointly set a date by which U.S. military disengagement should be completed. Roughly a year might be a good goal -- but the date must be agreed on with the Iraqis and announced as a joint decision. In the meantime, the U.S. should avoid military escalation, including the troop "surge," which can, at best, have only a passing tactical benefit.

Only by holding serious talks with Iraqi politicians about an exit date can we identify the authentic Iraqi leaders with the self-confidence and capacity to stand on their own legs, without U.S. military protection. The painful reality is that the current Iraqi regime, characterized by the Bush administration as representative of the Iraqi people, largely defines itself by its physical location: the 4-square-mile U.S. fortress within Baghdad -- protected by a wall 15 feet thick in places and manned by heavily armed U.S. military -- popularly known as the Green Zone. Only Iraqi leaders who can exercise real power beyond the Green Zone can eventually reach a genuine Iraqi accommodation.

Third, the United States should encourage Iraqi leaders to issue an invitation to all neighbors of Iraq and perhaps some other Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Pakistan, to discuss how best to enhance stability in Iraq in conjunction with U.S. military disengagement and to participate eventually in a conference regarding regional stability.

Such a serious discussion about regional security cannot be undertaken with Iraq or its neighbors while the U.S. is perceived as an occupier for an indefinite duration. Iraq's neighbors don't fear any real explosion in Iraq because we're there, and the volatile status quo comes at our expense and does not require them to make any real choices.

But an agreed-on departure date would have the effect of forcing all of the governments around Iraq to ask themselves: "How do we deal with the problem of stability in Iraq? Do we really want to have a regional war among ourselves?" Would a war that might, for example, pit the Saudis and the Jordanians against the Iranians, with the Syrians in between, be worth risking? Most of the regimes in the region know that that kind of a war could spread and destroy them.