Russia's playing ball -- will we?

HERE'S SOME good news: Russia is moving toward cooperating with the United States when it comes to Iran. This week at a Senate hearing, a State Department representative indicated that Russia could be expected to press Iran on the matter of nuclear proliferation. It's also becoming clear that the Kremlin would support further sanctions against Iran and would withhold nuclear fuel from the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But that good news could change.

The Kremlin's movement toward the U.S. position on Iran comes in part from a reluctance to see a nuclear-armed Iran, concern over Ahmadinejad's unpredictability, eagerness to avoid a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and frustration over contractual disputes with Tehran. But it is also a gesture toward the Bush administration and European powers that Moscow wants to be viewed as a responsible player in the world arena.

Now Russia is waiting for the U.S. response on issues important to the Kremlin. First up is the question of independence for the Serbian region of Kosovo. Populated by ethnic Albanians, Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia until 1999, when a U.S.-orchestrated NATO intervention -- without a U.N. Security Council mandate -- seized the territory and established what is essentially a U.N. protectorate under de facto administration by NATO.

Now, with billions of dollars spent, NATO wants to end its mission. On March 26, the United Nations is expected to consider gradual independence for Kosovo. The Kosovo government has embraced the proposal, but Serbia, which wants to regain control of Kosovo, rejects it. Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica complains that by granting Kosovo independence, the United Nations would for the first time formally break up a sovereign member state without its consent.

But much more than the rights of the Serbs and the Kosovars is at stake, and this is where things get complicated. Moscow, which has a veto on the Security Council, has made clear that it will oppose any plan opposed by Serbia. Except, possibly, under one set of circumstances: Moscow could theoretically be persuaded to abstain on the condition that independence would also be granted to pro-Russian separatist enclaves in the country of Georgia.

Like Kosovo vis-a-vis Serbia, those Georgian enclaves -- Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- have enjoyed effective independence for years, and their populations have lists of grievances against Georgians. Georgia, however, considers them its territory, and Georgia is quickly becoming the No. 1 U.S. client state in the Caucasus.