"I, as chief of police, regret deeply that this occurred on my watch," Bratton told a City Hall news conference, where he was joined by Villaraigosa and other city leaders. "I accept full responsibility for it occurring on my watch."
Villaraigosa condemned the police response, saying the LAPD had an obligation to ensure the protesters' and reporters' freedom of speech.
"What happened was wrong," he said. "The inadequate planning, the breakdown in command and control, misuse of tactics created a cascading chain of escalating misjudgments."
The "cascade" began well before the May Day protest, the report found.
Deputy Chief Lee Carter, who was in charge of policing the rally and has since retired after being demoted, "underestimated the size and significance" of the event, even though a May Day gathering a year before drew hundreds of thousands of people.
When a Rampart-area captain suggested additional planning before the march, he was "verbally reprimanded" by Carter, the report said. Additionally, the officers who ultimately confronted the protesters -- including those from the elite Metropolitan Division -- played no role in the planning phase.
Three hours before the march turned violent, Carter, Assistant Chief Earl Paysinger and Deputy Chief Richard Roupoli decided to reduce the police presence at the park. The commanders released three of four platoons that had been ordered to stand by.
As the crowds grew that afternoon, Carter and the other commanders did not take advantage of the more than 450 officers available to handle the crowds at the park, relying instead on a smaller group of Metro officers who easily became overwhelmed. But even the 450 officers were about half what several local police captains had told superiors were needed to handle the crowds.
As chaos ensued in the park, officers and their commanders grew confused over who was in charge. Rampart-area Capt. John Egan had been designated as LAPD's point person at the park. But Carter and Cmdr. Louis Gray began to make decisions and give orders.
The resulting mix-up left no single "incident commander" in control and made line officers uncertain about who was directing the operation. In one radio transmission, a lieutenant referred to the person in charge as "they," underscoring the absence of a single leader as LAPD policy requires. The report said officers noticed "obvious tension" among the three command officers and that numerous requests over the radio for information and resources went unanswered, leaving lieutenants in the field to formulate their own plans to control the crowd.
