The embodiment of 'surge' in Iraq

WASHINGTON — When Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno began his second tour of duty in Iraq late in 2006 as the war's No. 2 commander, he was handed a battle plan that he and his staff quickly determined was out of touch with reality -- a set of precise timetables for handing over whole provinces to Iraqi security forces, regardless of their readiness.

"This race to victory based on a timeline did not pass the common-sense test," said a top Odierno aide, citing the threat of widespread violence.

So Odierno made a fateful move: He challenged his boss, Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., to change the strategy. It was an opening salvo in the behind-the-scenes battle over what became known as the "surge."

And Odierno's challenge, though initially spurned, goes a long way toward explaining why he was nominated last week to succeed Army Gen. David H. Petraeus as the overall commander in Iraq.

The tall, intimidating artilleryman with a shaved head and a grave bearing was an early believer in what is now basic U.S. policy in Iraq. And he has proved he will stand up for it under fire.

Odierno's commitment to the new approach is all the stronger because he embraces it with the fervor of a convert. During his first tour in Iraq, in 2003 and 2004, critics charged that his dedication to overwhelming force and firepower was the antithesis of counterinsurgency doctrine.

As a result, although Petraeus has become the face of the war, it is Odierno who more truly mirrors the American military's experience in Iraq.

Another kind of training

Odierno began his first tour in 2003 as a two-star division commander.

Like much of the rest of the Army, he was trained to fight a conventional war, and was out of his element facing a guerrilla insurgency.

Then, again like the Army itself, Odierno remade himself into the kind of nimble, flexible commander required to fight an irregular war, as comfortable discussing economic development and tribal politics as planning a military offensive.

"I'm convinced he went through a complete metamorphosis," said retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, who is close to Odierno.

"He educated himself and became the very best operational commander we have in conducting irregular warfare."

It is difficult to understate the skepticism within the military's tightknit group of counterinsurgency experts that greeted Odierno's assignment as the second-highest-ranking officer in Iraq with day-to-day responsibility for conducting the war.