The embodiment of 'surge' in Iraq

It was, at least in part, what he learned that prodded him to stand up to Casey.

He insists that Casey was receptive, but Odierno aides and other Pentagon officials said Casey was initially hostile and vetoed higher troop levels.

"It didn't go over real popular upfront under Gen. Casey's regime, because obviously he was very wedded to the plan," said Brig. Gen. Joseph Anderson, Odierno's chief of staff.

"People don't like someone new coming in and saying, 'Oh, by the way, we think differently.' "

Odierno also began nightly sessions with his closest senior staff to discuss ways to change the military's mind-set.

"If we do not identify the threat appropriately, and hence apply the wrong strategy, the risk is that we become a greater driver of instability," an internal document prepared for those discussions says.

Although Petraeus, not Odierno, has received much of the credit for Iraq's shifting fortunes, Petraeus himself has publicly acknowledged Odierno's role.

"Shortly after assuming command . . . he forthrightly requested additional forces; then he and his staff began developing an operational concept for their employment," Petraeus said at the conclusion of Odierno's tour in February. "His recommendations for what came to be known as the surge forces have since been proven correct."

Anderson argues that Odierno's embrace of counterinsurgency tactics during his second tour in Iraq will be remembered as the turning point in the war.

"This tour will, in my view, eradicate anything that was [said] before, or at least give people second thoughts about what kind of guy he really is," Anderson said. "I believe he'll be [remembered as] the architect -- the guy with the plan who turned this place around."

Sitting in his spacious office near Odierno's, Anderson paused and reconsidered: "If this all goes south again, I'm not sure he'll be remembered for any of it."

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peter.spiegel@latimes.com