Many analysts, former police and military officers and citizens said they feared that weak political will, corruption and the shortcomings of the nation's anti-terrorism forces would undermine needed reform. All too often, some observers said, terrorist incidents become political footballs for a variety of reasons.
For starters: With Muslims accounting for 13% of India's population, politicians tend to avoid pushing too hard against militant Islamists for fear of alienating this important voting bloc.
"The issue of anti-terrorism, especially around election time, is radioactive," said Ryan Clarke, a researcher with Singapore's International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, saying areas with large Muslim populations can play swing roles in close elections.
Another problem, others said, is that India's porous borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal and entry points along the coast make it easy to launch militant operations from a neighboring country and then slip away. Last week's attackers reportedly sneaked into the city aboard rubber dinghies launched from a hijacked fishing trawler.
"Mumbai has 15 patrol boats, and none of them are used for patrolling," said lawyer and former Mumbai policeman Y.P. Singh. "There's such complacency."
Security experts say individual police officers and national guard personnel performed bravely during last week's standoff. And some of the targets chosen by the militants, such as the vast Taj Mahal and Oberoi hotels, would challenge most security organizations. But these factors were far outweighed by deep structural problems, poor intelligence, inadequate equipment and limited training, they add.
Anti-terrorist operations ideally need to quickly and decisively respond. The longer officials wait, the more time terrorists have to wreak havoc and hole themselves up in defensive positions, experts say.
Mumbai lost three of its top anti-terrorism officials almost immediately when the violence began; they were gunned down as they rode together in a van. The three should not have been in the same vehicle, experts said, nor should they have exposed themselves to danger. Their loss badly handicapped the early response.
Mumbai has no equivalent of a SWAT team. It took hours to decide to send in the nation's rapid-response National Security Guards, based in New Delhi. The capital is three hours away by air, but no military aircraft were available and the unit evidently lacked authority to requisition a commercial plane. Military transport was flown in from elsewhere.
