The CIA teams in the border region are part of a "surge" launched in 2006 after senior CIA officials had gathered for a tense counter-terrorism conference at the agency's training compound, known as The Farm, near Williamsburg, Va.
"The question was posed, 'Where is Osama and why haven't we caught him?' " said a former CIA officer familiar with the matter. The reply from the agency's Islamabad station chief reflected the frustration.
"Do you have any idea how few officers I actually have?" the station chief said, according to the account of the former officer. "There are more counter-terrorism officers in Rome."
A different tack
Months later, the agency began moving in as many as 50 additional officers, most of them assigned to bases in what is known in Pakistan as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a largely lawless region that has been Al Qaeda's base since its leadership fled Afghanistan in 2001.
The objective was to close in on Al Qaeda by going after "not the inner circle, but the second or third tier out," said a former high-ranking CIA official involved in the decision.
Overall, the CIA has deployed about 200 people to Pakistan, according to current and former officials, making it the agency's largest overseas operation outside Iraq.
But the CIA is only part of a much broader U.S. intelligence presence in the country. Officials said CIA operatives work alongside officers from the National Security Agency, which intercepts electronic communications, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which examines images from spy satellites.
The various agencies have formed a "joint targeting cell" at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital, officials said. The cell pores over data from human and electronic sources to try to find Bin Laden and other figures.
Searching for fresh ideas, some officials have proposed employing some of the strategies of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq.
A senior Bush administration official said the National Security Council has spent much of the year debating whether the "Awakening" movement in Iraq's Anbar province could be replicated in the Pakistani tribal areas. But discussions have bogged down amid skepticism that the model could work.
In Anbar, Sunni Arab sheiks fed up with the violence wrought by Sunni insurgents began cooperating with the U.S. military. Local fighters were persuaded to reject the Al Qaeda in Iraq group and join neighborhood security forces paid by the U.S. The effort led to a dramatic decrease in attacks in Anbar, once the most violent area of the country.
