Re-upping in Iraq

A third factor is growing Iraqi complacency. With Iraqi troops performing better recently in Basra, Sadr City and Mosul, Prime Minister Nouri Maliki may be starting to think that he doesn't need the Americans after all. Maybe the Iraqis are ready to go it alone. The U.S. high command inadvertently has encouraged this illusion by stressing Iraqi contributions in its public pronouncements while downplaying the role Americans still play.

In reality, while Iraqi troops are becoming much more capable, they still rely on U.S. assistance for key "enablers" such as logistics, surveillance, communications and air support. Without that help, which is coordinated by U.S. advisors embedded with Iraqi units, Iraqi security forces -- no matter how brave and dedicated -- would be hard put to operate successfully against such hardened terrorists as Al Qaeda and the extremist Shiite factions known as "special groups." American troops also serve a vital function as a buffer between sectarian groups still suspicious of one another.

It's true that fewer American combat troops are needed. The security situation continues to improve, notwithstanding the withdrawal of three of five "surge" brigades (the fourth is now leaving and the fifth will depart next month), ultimately reducing U.S. troops from 170,000 to about 140,000. But the contributions of U.S. logistics people, advisors, air crews, intelligence collectors and other specialists continue to be as important as ever. It will be years before the Iraqis are able to take over some of these functions.

The gap between the Iraqi and U.S. positions is hardly unbridgeable. It should be quite possible to come up with face-saving work-arounds that would allow the Americans to get the terms they need while allowing the Iraqis to save face. For instance, while U.S. units now can detain terrorist suspects on their own, those detentions eventually have to be approved by a joint board of Iraqi and U.S. officers. In the future, the initial detention decision could be subject to the oversight of that same board.

But in order to reach an accord, the U.S. will need to do a better job of diplomacy -- never a strong suit of this administration. The Iraqis, for their part, will have to overcome the intoxication produced by recent victories and come to a realistic appraisal that they will need substantial American support for years to come.