In this age of mindless phrases, such as "out-of-the-box thinking" and "a time for change," another silly phrase -- favored by presidents Bush, Clinton and Bush -- is causing America's defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. The phrase is "small, light and fast," and it refers to the kind of military that they think we need to have.
"Small, light and fast" means not your grandfather's Army -- far fewer heavy weapons and far less of the ground infantry that made up the conventional forces the United States has always relied on in major wars. Instead, its proponents believe, the U.S. military should rely more on covert operations and special forces to fight counterinsurgencies and irregular wars.
To varying degrees, Sens. Hillary Rodham Clinton, John McCain and Barack Obama want this as well. Obama, for example, recently called for "more special operations resources along the Afghan-Pakistan border."
But this approach cannot work. One lesson of the last decade is that our leaders' efforts to win wars with the CIA-led clandestine service and U.S. Special Forces in the lead only delivers defeat. We cannot fight a worldwide uprising of radical Islamists with the type of forces once thought most appropriate to suppress rebels on tiny Caribbean islands.
Afghanistan is the best example of this reality. U.S. covert forces performed superbly there, winning the first battles against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11 -- but they lacked the personnel and firepower to annihilate the enemy, against whom we are now losing the war.
This should not be surprising. The clandestine service and special forces were never designed to be war winners; they are meant to complement the application of America's overwhelming conventional forces against U.S. enemies. Anyone who reads works on the recommended book lists of the Army chief of staff and the Marines Corps commandant -- books by such writers as Stephen Ambrose, Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman and Dwight Eisenhower -- will find little indication that wars can won by clandestine and special forces. Only Max Boot and his brethren at the Weekly Standard, Commentary and the National Review preach such nonsense as gospel.
I know something about the limitations of these kinds of operations because I managed CIA covert operations aimed at Al Qaeda and Sunni Islamists for 15 years. It is clear to me that the most that covert forces can do is to hold the ring until conventional forces arrive to destroy the foe. The CIA was suggesting this back in 1997 -- see Page 349 of the 9/11 commission report -- and it remains true.
