Fallon's sin: disagreeing publicly
Larry,
I agree that we have a great deal to admire about William "Fox" Fallon -- from his combat experience in the skies over Vietnam to his impressive intellect. I think he has served our nation well, particularly in his last position commanding Centcom, where he reportedly served as a bulwark against this administration's aggressive plans for Iran.
However, I disagree that we should lionize Fallon here. I also disagree with your favorable comparison of him to Shinseki, because I think the two officers' performance has little in common. And, more broadly, I think we should not applaud a senior military officer for what effectively amounts to an act of civil disobedience.
When Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee that "something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required" to secure post-war Iraq, he did so in response to a question. He had gone to the Senate that day as the chief of staff of the Army, and he provided that answer in his official capacity to elected members of Congress. He didn't seek out the question, nor did he try to leak this answer to the media beforehand, even though his answer clearly reflected months of staff work and thought. Further, the number of troops required to accomplish a military mission was clearly a matter within his expertise and purview as chief of the Army. Shinseki avoided the ultimate questions of war and peace, leaving those to the nation's political leadership.
Fallon, by contrast, sought out Esquire writer Thomas Barnett to tell his story after cultivating a close relationship with Barnett over the course of many months. Unlike Shinseki, Fallon, when he spoke to Barnett, provided his professional military advice and analysis to a reporter, not to his chain of command or to Congress. He publicly broke ranks with the White House and the Pentagon on the Iran issue, and according to Fred Kaplan in Slate, he did so on other issues as well.
Fallon may eventually be proved right on the merits, but we might not always agree with the generals or admirals. During the 1990s, the top military brass frequently opposed the Clinton administration's military policies, whether the issue was allowing gays to serve in the military or deploying peacekeepers to the Balkans. Generals and admirals frequently worked covertly with members of Congress to obstruct White House initiatives. Senior military officers made an art form out of invoking the Powell Doctrine to oppose prospective military missions on the grounds that they were too risky, too costly or lacked a sufficiently clear exit strategy. Consequently, America dragged its feet entering the Balkans and failed to intervene at all in Rwanda. I think these episodes showed the danger of relying too much on generals for key strategic decisions.
