BASRA, IRAQ — The corniche buzzes at night: drivers honking to friends on the sidewalk, teenagers joy-riding rickety motorboats along the murky Shatt al Arab, families lining up for rides on the yellow-lit Ferris wheel.
Mazen Abdul Kareem gazes at the water, remembering when the gunmen trawled the boardwalk in their tinted-window Toyotas. Even then, he would come, just looking out where the Tigris and Euphrates rivers merge and flow into the Persian Gulf, wondering whether his time was near. There were too many victims. Doctors. Professors. Women. Students. Musicians.
For three years, Basra was held hostage to greed-fueled conflicts, a city synonymous with gangs fighting for control of the region's oil resources and lucrative oil-smuggling trade. One senior Iraqi Cabinet member cautioned that the city's blend of corruption and gangland politics could very well be Iraq's future.
In late March, Prime Minister Nouri Maliki dispatched an estimated 33,000 troops to tackle the militias and assert control over Iraq's economic gateway. But even as residents hope that a new era has dawned, they are fearful that once this Iraqi operation is over, the city could again fall victim to political violence.
In interviews, security officials and residents pointed to what they called the lack of clean hands in the city. With most local political figures linked to the fighting and criminal activities of the last three years, the Maliki operation's effectiveness in bringing long-term stability to Basra is questionable.
"There are 47 parties in Basra, and all of them have militias," said a high-ranking security official with detailed knowledge of the Basra operation. Like many others interviewed for this report, he spoke on condition of anonymity.
Three mid-level police officers here described the hellish situation before troops moved in -- mayhem that involved just about every player in the city. They accused the Mahdi Army, which is loyal to populist cleric Muqtada Sadr, of kidnapping doctors and other professionals; an Iranian-backed religious party called Thar Allah (Vengeance of God) of killing unveiled women; Basra Gov. Mohammed Waeli's Al Fadila al Islamiya party of oil smuggling; and the Badr Organization militia allied with the leading member of Iraq's ruling coalition of arms dealing and assassinating political rivals.
"We don't trust any of the parties," one of the officers said.
Although Maliki has grown in stature for ordering the Basra offensive, Sadr's followers have alleged that the operation was intended to help Maliki and his chief partner, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, to wrest control of Basra.
Before the campaign, Sadr's radical movement had been poised for victory in provincial elections, scheduled for fall, which the United States hopes will go a long way toward ending Iraq's strife.
"We controlled everything in Basra. We were able to apprehend the criminals. The police couldn't believe it," Mahdi Army spokesman Muhannad Hashimi told The Times. "We had more authority than the government. We had supporters everywhere and the people loved us."
Slashed portraits of Sadr and Mahdi Army fighters reinforce the group's belief that the operation amounted to a power grab. The campaign's first week saw troops raid Sadr strongholds, sparking clashes with Mahdi Army militiamen.
The fighting stopped only when Sadr commanded his troops to lay down their arms. A flattened prayer tent and the collapsed, bullet-riddled Sadr office are testament to the new order.
The high-ranking security official alleged that the offensive, dubbed the "Knights' Onslaught," had been moved up from June to March under pressure from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council to weaken the Mahdi Army. With the campaign, the officer said, SIIC and its Badr militia have positioned themselves to win the elections by whatever means.
"Basra is crucial," he said. "Before the Knights' Onslaught the city was under Sadr's control. Now SIIC and Badr have decided they will win."
Supreme Council officials dismissed the allegations. Abu Zeinab Kanani, the party's deputy chief in Basra, also denied any involvement in criminal activity.
"No party can be above the law," he said. "If one of our members breached the law, they would not be considered a part of our party."
Residents say that before the operation, politics and criminal activity were blurred. No movement was immune to the temptations of the thriving underworld, they say.
"Most of the officials were affiliated to political parties. Some from the Sadrists and others from SIIC," said a senior employee at Basra's Abu Fulus port. "All of them benefited from the smuggling."
A policeman who patrolled a key smuggling route recalled that when he was assigned his post, his colleagues gave him little choice but to help steal oil.
