Although Maliki has grown in stature for ordering the Basra offensive, Sadr's followers have alleged that the operation was intended to help Maliki and his chief partner, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, to wrest control of Basra.
Before the campaign, Sadr's radical movement had been poised for victory in provincial elections, scheduled for fall, which the United States hopes will go a long way toward ending Iraq's strife.
"We controlled everything in Basra. We were able to apprehend the criminals. The police couldn't believe it," Mahdi Army spokesman Muhannad Hashimi told The Times. "We had more authority than the government. We had supporters everywhere and the people loved us."
Slashed portraits of Sadr and Mahdi Army fighters reinforce the group's belief that the operation amounted to a power grab. The campaign's first week saw troops raid Sadr strongholds, sparking clashes with Mahdi Army militiamen.
The fighting stopped only when Sadr commanded his troops to lay down their arms. A flattened prayer tent and the collapsed, bullet-riddled Sadr office are testament to the new order.
The high-ranking security official alleged that the offensive, dubbed the "Knights' Onslaught," had been moved up from June to March under pressure from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council to weaken the Mahdi Army. With the campaign, the officer said, SIIC and its Badr militia have positioned themselves to win the elections by whatever means.
"Basra is crucial," he said. "Before the Knights' Onslaught the city was under Sadr's control. Now SIIC and Badr have decided they will win."
Supreme Council officials dismissed the allegations. Abu Zeinab Kanani, the party's deputy chief in Basra, also denied any involvement in criminal activity.
"No party can be above the law," he said. "If one of our members breached the law, they would not be considered a part of our party."
Residents say that before the operation, politics and criminal activity were blurred. No movement was immune to the temptations of the thriving underworld, they say.
"Most of the officials were affiliated to political parties. Some from the Sadrists and others from SIIC," said a senior employee at Basra's Abu Fulus port. "All of them benefited from the smuggling."
A policeman who patrolled a key smuggling route recalled that when he was assigned his post, his colleagues gave him little choice but to help steal oil.
