The disappearance of that traditional leadership, which supported Islamic moderation, tribal culture and the code of the Pashtuns, allowed the Taliban to extend its writ over the whole region. Protecting the population, especially those loyal to the government, is the very first lesson in counterinsurgency, but the army failed to apply it in FATA. It cannot afford to make the same mistake in South Waziristan.
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Pakistan focuses on Islamic extremism
For years, the government and the army have not dealt with the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the tribal regions, but as the threat becomes clear, Islamabad will need international help.
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The army's offensive in the FATA region is crucial to global security because the area is home to Al Qaeda and numerous allied groups. But it will not be easy. The rugged, mountainous region lacks infrastructure and is now in the hands of the Taliban. The army's paramilitary troops have never won a decisive victory there.
This time, regular troops will be involved too, and U.S. forces on the Afghan side will provide a blocking force to prevent the Taliban from escaping into Afghanistan. But the Taliban and its allies are expected to create a distraction by opening new fronts in Punjab and intensifying suicide-bombing campaigns in Pakistani cities.
A key determiner of success will be the army's attitude toward the Afghan Taliban. After the Taliban was stripped of power in Afghanistan in 2001, the former military regime of President Pervez Musharraf gave refuge to the Afghan Taliban leadership and thousands of fighters. Using bases, recruitment and logistics in Pakistan, they revived their movement in Afghanistan in 2003 and today control much of southern and eastern Afghanistan.
Despite the presence of about 100,000 U.S. and NATO troops, Taliban attacks in Afghanistan have soared by 59% in the first five months of this year compared with the same period last year. In a single week in mid-June, there were more than 400 Taliban attacks -- the largest number ever.
Eliminating the Taliban threat will involve a battle of wills. If the U.S. or NATO falters at this critical juncture, it will be a signal for the Afghan population that the Taliban is winning and that Western forces want out.
In the end, though, it is Pakistan that must commit to eliminating Afghan Taliban leaders who continue living in Pakistan. Destroying their facilities in Pakistan, enforcing a cease-fire during the elections and pressuring them into talks with the Kabul government are just some of the steps that Islamabad can take.
For the army and the fragile civilian government of President Asif Zardari, international support is crucial. So is greater maturity by India, which must revive stalled peace talks with Pakistan on the disputed territory of Kashmir, because reducing the threat along the Indo-Pakistan border would allow Pakistani troops to more fully focus on the Taliban.
The Pakistani public, army and government have suddenly awakened to the Taliban threat. That is a crucial first step. But it will need strong international support to effectively respond.
