Interior leaders say they will evaluate the entire system of regulating offshore drilling as part of a series of investigations into the BP spill.
"We're looking at everything," Matt Lee-Ashley, an Interior spokesman, said in a written statement. The investigations, he added, "will help us get to the bottom of what happened and determine what changes might need to be made to ensure this never happens again. We expect an important part of this work will include an evaluation of the risk-assessment modeling currently employed. Those findings will direct what changes, if any, may be required."
To drill in federal waters, companies must clear a series of MMS reviews, including several meant to gauge environmental risk. Companies must detail the equipment and procedures involved in their operations and develop contingency plans to respond to accidents.
But even though MMS approved a BP spill-prevention plan last year that said the "worst case" blowout could spew 250,000 barrels of oil a day — the equivalent of an Exxon-Valdez-size catastrophe once a day — no one appears to have developed a response plan for that scenario.
MMS calculates the risk of a major spill based on historical precedent, even as gulf drilling moves into unprecedented depths. Because of that, the assessments don't accurately reflect new challenges of drilling for oil far from equipment and support, to depths inhospitable to divers, where extremes of pressures and temperatures can tax materials such as cements used to fix casings, or synthetic materials used for seals and valves.
In addition, unfamiliar formations in the deep sea can contain hidden surprises, such as contaminants or layers of unforeseen high pressure. A gas leak at the seafloor may result in gas expanding very quickly as it travels the long distance to the water's surface — in the worst case, producing blowouts. Such a scenario is being investigated in the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
Even though the BP drilling project faced all those challenges, MMS officials last year concluded after a month of study that it did not pose a large enough spill risk to warrant a detailed review under the National Environmental Policy Act. Decisions to grant those so-called categorical exclusions from the act have become common practice at MMS, which granted two dozen of them even after the Deepwater Horizon sank.
Officials say that MMS' frequent spill-preparedness drills, sprung upon unsuspecting oil companies in the dead of night, have never approximated anything close to a blowout the size of the Horizon disaster. Instead, the drills often model one of the most common types of spills to occur in the gulf: a discharge of 50 to 100 gallons of fuel in a botched interchange between rig and tanker. Officials and outside supporters say the practice means the management service is focusing on the most likely scenarios.
Lynn Scarlett, a former deputy secretary of Interior, said budget constraints have hamstrung MMS' ability to meet more demanding responsibilities as energy prospecting has moved farther offshore.
"In the deep water — that's precisely when these agencies need more resources to deploy the most extensive analysis that is available to us," she said. "Unfortunately, they don't have those resources available to them. That may ring hollow to the American public. But I have sympathy for agencies that are asked to do so much."
BP officials said again Friday that since such an event had never occurred, they couldn't be expected to have tools on hand to stanch the oil leak.
A collection of federal agencies focused largely on skimming the slick and spraying chemical dispersant to break up the oil. Responders even began to corral the oil slick in booms and light it on fire, but discovered there were not enough flame-resistant fire booms.
Robotic submarines could not manipulate a mechanism designed to prevent blowouts, although they succeeded in cutting a pipe and installing a valve to stop one leak. Now BP officials are looking to the untested cofferdam to give them time to find a permanent fix.
Privately, some federal officials predict the spill will force major changes in how the government regulates drilling and prepares for spills. And even the current system virtually guarantees officials will be more prepared next time: Government risk models based only on a precedent now have one.
jtankersley@latimes.com
julie.cart@latimes.com
Times staff writer Jill Leovy in Los Angeles contributed to this report.