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Will the cyber worm turn?

Stuxnet reportedly set back Iran's nuclear program. That's the good news. But what about threat to us?

January 23, 2011

The tale of the Stuxnet worm is one of those seemingly good-news stories that grows more worrisome over time.

Security experts first became aware of the mysterious Stuxnet malware last summer, but it wasn't until months later that they agreed on its likely target: Iran's secretive nuclear weapons program. The worm hid itself benignly in personal computers, spreading (often through USB drives) until it could infect machines made by Siemens that control motors and other industrial equipment. The infected controllers intermittently sent the motors racing, all the while reporting that everything was normal.

Analysts speculate that Stuxnet damaged a sizable percentage of the gas centrifuges at Iran's well-guarded uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, which relies on Siemens controllers. Iran hasn't talked in detail about the situation, but U.S. and Israeli officials (who won't discuss Stuxnet publicly) are no longer projecting that Iran is poised to develop an atomic bomb. Instead, they've pushed back their estimates by several years, citing unspecified "technological problems."

If Stuxnet was responsible for slowing Iran's nuclear development, then it accomplished over a period of a few months what the United States and its allies have failed to do in years of talks, threats and sanctions. It also achieved that goal without a shot being fired, buying more time for negotiators to try to persuade Iran to stop its bomb-making efforts.

That's the encouraging side of the story. The other side is that Stuxnet demonstrates heretofore unseen capabilities of cyber attackers, many of whom aren't playing for our side.

The stakes are particularly high for the United States, where so many crucial pieces of infrastructure — such as the electrical grid, transit systems, sewage treatment plants and dams — rely on automated systems. But security experts are sharply divided over how imminent the threat is, with some saying the risk of cyber warfare has been overblown by self-interested public officials and contractors, and others expressing grave concern and calling on the government to shore up defenses on the double.

Governments have long engaged in the sort of sabotage that Stuxnet evidently was designed to do. In the 1980s, for example, the U.S. supplied unwitting Soviet agents with defective equipment, components and designs to disrupt a number of high-priority technology projects. What's different about Stuxnet is the use of computer malware to accomplish that disruption remotely.

One of the signal achievements of the Stuxnet authors was their ability to infect machines that aren't connected to the Internet, and possibly not to any kind of computer network. Manufacturers of industrial controllers and automation equipment had long assumed that they didn't need elaborate security mechanisms because they weren't online. That assumption gave way over the years to a more cautious approach, based on the theory that even isolated computers could be vulnerable. Stuxnet has proved those fears to be well founded.

Granted, creating Stuxnet required far more resources than ordinary hackers typically possess. Security analysts say the worm appears to have been produced by a team of people over a period of months, and it could not have been accomplished without extensive knowledge of the targeted controllers and software as well as the setup in Natanz. That's why so many fingers have pointed at the U.S. and/or Israeli governments as the likely masterminds.

So Stuxnet doesn't provide a blueprint for wreaking havoc on U.S. nuclear plants or financial institutions. Nevertheless, it's hard to ignore the signs that a new kind of arms race has started, one that goes beyond the denial-of-service attacks and corporate espionage that hackers allegedly conducted, either at the direction of or in support of their governments, against Estonia in 2007, the former Soviet republic of Georgia in 2008 and Google in 2009.

The thought of such an arms race is troubling for at least two reasons. The first is that we don't know how the existing international laws and treaties that govern conventional conflicts would apply to cyber war, if at all. For example, what constitutes an attack, how can anyone tell who's responsible, and what kind of response is justified?

More important, the United States isn't positioned well to defend against a weapon of Stuxnet's caliber. It's not for lack of trying; over the last year, the Obama administration has activated a "cyber command" at the Defense Department to raise the military's defenses against intrusion and develop offensive capabilities, and it has improved coordination between the Pentagon's efforts and the Department of Homeland Security's initiative on the civilian response to cyber threats.

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