How are insurgents able to continue launching deadly attacks in Afghanistan 10 years into the U.S.-led war there? Part of the blame — perhaps even the bulk of it — lies with Pakistan's army and its powerful intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, known by the acronym ISI.
For decades, Pakistan has conducted a proxy war in Afghanistan through Islamist insurgent groups that it has created, nurtured and supplied. There is considerable evidence that these groups are managed not by "rogue" ISI elements, as has sometimes been asserted, but by the agency itself. The ISI is a disciplined military institution that answers to the orders of the military command, a point former Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharraf often emphasized. The current Pakistani army chief, army Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, was director of the ISI under Musharraf, and he headed the organization during 2005, when the Taliban began to make a strategic comeback in Afghanistan, operating from protected sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Today, three Pakistani-supported proxy groups are fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan: the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's smaller terrorist group, Hezb-i-Islami. Not one of them has been placed on the U.S. State Department's official list of foreign terrorist organizations.
Putting these groups on the list would make them subject to a range of U.S. sanctions, and it should be done immediately. There is extensive documentation in the public record — and extensive classified intelligence documentation — of their attacks on American forces inside Afghanistan, including the Haqqani network's deadly attacks at the U.S. Embassy and NATO headquarters last month. As Adm. Michael G. Mullen, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee recently, the Haqqani network "acts as a veritable arm" of the ISI.
The U.S. campaign against global terrorism cannot succeed as long as Pakistan's army and ISI continue to support terrorist sanctuaries and training facilities inside Pakistan. The same training camps used to prepare thousands of Afghan, Pakistani and Arab fanatics to cross into Afghanistan also churn out global terrorists like the Pakistani American Faisal Shahzad, who tried to bomb Times Square last year.
Americans need to realize that terrorists' attempts to strike the United States from sanctuaries in Pakistan will occur again and again unless their bases are closed down. Bombs targeting American cities will inevitably become more lethal with time. Today they are conventional. Tomorrow they are likely to be biological, chemical or nuclear.
Washington has long considered Pakistan an important ally, and so has tread lightly for fear of alienating the nuclear-armed and strategically located country. But it is time to add an "or else" to our dealings with Islamabad.
In the weeks since Mullen's harsh language before the Senate, members of the Obama administration have sought to soften the rhetoric somewhat. White House spokesman Jay Carney described Mullen's comments as consistent with U.S. policy but said that he would not have used Mullen's language. Other officials, speaking on background, said Mullen's remarks weren't reflective of U.S. policy.
But there are also indications that the U.S. could be finally ready to adopt a tougher approach. The day after Mullen spoke, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, publicly requested "that the State Department take the additional step of listing the [Haqqani] network as a foreign terrorist organization," noting that the organization "meets the [legal] standards" for this designation. Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the State Department was completing a "final formal review" preparatory to listing the organization. And at his Wednesday White House press conference President Obama warned that "there's no doubt that, you know, we're not going to feel comfortable with a long-term relationship with Pakistan if we don't think that they are mindful of our interests as well."
These are steps in the right direction, but they don't go nearly far enough. The George W. Bush and Obama administrations' "soft" policy of persuasion mixed with bountiful aid and expectations of progress has failed. The U.S. needs to take a much harder stance on Pakistan's promotion of Islamist terrorism in the region and globally.