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August 24, 1992
If the free trade pact eliminates most barriers to the free flow of investment between the United States, Canada and Mexico, will it also result in reducing barriers for the free flow of aliens across borders too? Many of us are concerned about the immediate effect of NAFTA on the free flow of illegal aliens across our borders. Some companies will benefit from the pact and others will be hurt by it, but all of us in border states are already hurting from the increased financial burdens for illegals who are already here.
March 6, 2005
It's not surprising that American farmers are suffering from garlic dumping by Chinese companies ("Influx of Chinese Garlic Wrinkles Noses in U.S.," Feb. 28). The U.S. government has done a poor job of protecting American business from the unfair trading practices of other nations under the guise of free trade. Washington has allowed NAFTA, Airbus, Japanese car companies and many other man-made disasters to damage U.S. business. These injustices have gone on for decades. The politicians in our nation's capital have shown little interest in protecting U.S. workers and businesses.
April 7, 1992
It was with great interest that I read Jorge Castaneda's article about free trade and immigration ("Again, People Are Mexico's No. 1 Export," Column Left, March 24). He has always been vocal about his opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement. It is interesting to see, however, how he rejects the fallacy so often used by NAFTA opponents in this country: the notion that free trade will create the loss of thousands of U.S. jobs because companies will feel encouraged to move to Mexico seeking lower wages.
August 4, 2001
John O. McGinnis has it backward when he says that we do not need to extend fast-track provisions of trade promotion authority to cover environmental and labor standards (" . . . No, Free Trade Needs a Free Rein," Commentary, July 30). He claims that the cumbersome procedures of our regular legislative process "protect liberty" and "restrain special interests from getting benefits for themselves at the expense of the public." On the contrary, the more cumbersome the process, the more the special interests can get their way. Well-heeled interests can afford to hire lobbyists and analysts to pay attention to every step of a complicated process, while the general public only notices the final vote in Congress.
January 10, 1995
Re "Zedillo Firms Up Details of Mexico Economic Plan," Jan. 3: If the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, and expecting a different outcome each time, then our policy of helping the Mexican government is, at least by this definition, insane. Their quasi-democracy is nothing but a facade for the oligarchy of the 30 or so families that control 70% of their nation's wealth and their hired henchmen known as the PRI. Our continued financial support of their government and our de facto open border policy are enabling the continuation of one of this hemisphere's most oppressive, corrupt and least democratic regimes.
October 25, 1993
Current negotiations between the U.S. and Japan indicate that Japan is unwilling to take major steps toward reducing its trade surplus with the U.S. Fortunately, a large reduction of this surplus can nevertheless be accomplished by shifting U.S. imports from Japan to Mexico. With the aid of NAFTA plus the other favorable economic factors that now prevail, much of what is now purchased from Japan can gradually be obtained from Mexico. Since Mexico buys $110 from the U.S. for every $100 we buy from Mexico, and since Japan buys only $45 for each $100 of its exports to the U.S., such a shift in sources of imports would add greatly to the total number of U.S. manufacturing jobs.
February 7, 1995
In Feb. 1 articles about the President extending a $20-billion credit to Mexico by executive order, thus avoiding congressional approval, there are several references to the White House staff being surprised by the lack of public and congressional support, in light of the 1993 NAFTA approval. The electorate's support for NAFTA was lukewarm. The President had to use his personal persuasion and commitments on a widespread basis to secure the necessary votes. At the same time the trade representative and the vice president were praising Mexico as an outstanding economic partner and as having its internal affairs in order.
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