August 11, 2004
Lawrence Korb is mistaken to reject the concept that major intelligence analyses should be subject to a Team B review ("It's Time to Bench 'Team B,' " Commentary, Aug. 8). Had this occurred with regard to the pre-Iraq war analyses, it is likely, based on the 9/11 commission report, that the common belief that Iraq had WMD would have been disputed. What Korb's view means is that a politicized Team B report is worthless and, indeed, harmful. Still, it seems clear that an objective Team B report is essential when the issue before the country, as in Iraq, is war or peace.
CALIFORNIA | LOCAL
September 20, 1999
Re "Time to Say Farewell to Spy Scandal," Column Left, Sept. 14: Robert Scheer asserted four main "facts"; each of them is false. Five days before his column appeared, the most recent National Intelligence Estimate--the consensus of the entire U.S. intelligence community--stated that the People's Republic of China is expected to test "a longer range mobile ICBM within the next several years; it will be targeted primarily against the United States."...
October 1, 2006 |
LAST WEEK, ONE of Washington's favorite spectator sports -- the secrecy game -- reached new heights of absurdity. Americans were treated to the spectacle of an administration obsessed with secrecy turning around and declassifying parts of one of the most highly secret documents produced by the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies.
September 26, 2006
Re "Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Fuels Terror," Sept. 24 How could anyone not have known this years ago? Did the Bush administration think that invading an Islamic nation and killing tens of thousands of civilians would somehow mysteriously reduce terrorism? Many Americans are puzzled that there is sectarian violence in Iraq. Shiites and Sunnis have been fighting each other for centuries. What did this administration think would happen when it dissolved the Iraqi army and police? Does anyone in the Bush administration think at all?
July 10, 2004 |
In a classified National Intelligence Estimate prepared before the Iraq war, the CIA hedged its judgments about Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction, pointing up the limits of its knowledge. But in the unclassified version of the NIE -- the so-called white paper cited by the Bush administration in making its case for war -- those carefully qualified conclusions were turned into blunt assertions of fact, according to the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on prewar intelligence.
November 21, 2006 |
FIFTEEN YEARS AGO, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence asked me to testify at the confirmation hearings for Robert M. Gates, who had been nominated to be director of Central Intelligence. I was asked because I had worked in the CIA's office of Soviet analysis back when Gates was the agency's deputy director for intelligence and chairman of the National Intelligence Council.